

Origunder Atlas
The Mediterranean and beyond

RED FLAG AT SEA —A SUPERPOWER AMERICAN STYLE

BY JURGEN DORN

Translated from RHEINISCHER MERKUR, Cologne



Looking from the Kremlin, all the seas seemed at the fingertips of Russian destiny. In Eastern Europe, of course, Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin had had a wretched time of it. Would oceans damp down freedom fervor in Czechoslovakia and Rumania? Or quench the sparks of protest in Poland and in the Soviet Union itself? (See "Russia's forbidden novel—praise from Prague": page 57.) Perhaps not.

But, as the sharply observant London *Economist* says in an article headed, "The Bear Learns to Swim," if Brezhnev and Kosygin "are hoping to justify themselves to their colleagues they have got one good argument. They have made it their aim to turn Russia into a real American-style superpower, and they can now say that they are on their way." Specifically, by the extension of Soviet sea power as well as its nuclear-military power. A recent example of the widening range of Russian warships: the voyage to Iraq by a cruiser and escort in the Indian Ocean and on into the Persian Gulf. The ships had sailed into Madras and Bombay only a few weeks before. Showing the flag in Asian waters (see map) brought sharply to mind the fateful dawn of February 6, 1904, when Admiral Togo signaled the powerful and superbly manned Japanese fleet: "We sail this morning. Our


enemy flies the Russian flag." The result was the destruction of the Czar's proud, yellow-funneled dreadnoughts in an ambush in Tsushima Strait—and, up to now, the end of any Russian pretense of globally effective sea power.

Most disturbing—even to Tito's Yugoslavia—has been the Soviets' naval strength in the Mediterranean, once the placid pond of the American Sixth Fleet and friendly European nations. Estimates range from thirty to fifty-five warcraft, including missile-launching submarines, in the Mediterranean—an impressive demonstration for a nation which had generally confined its sea power to conventional submarines until a few years ago. To back up its fleet afloat, the Soviet Union is building two, possibly three, helicopter-carriers, for example.

The broad objective is a force capable of striking far from home. The vastly significant meaning of Russian sea power, along with Moscow's energetic move for greater trade in Asia, is extensively explored in this ATLAS series of articles. The first is by Jürgen Dorn, who writes on Soviet global strategy—and its navy's roles—in the West German Christian Democratic weekly, *Rheinischer Merkur*, published in Cologne...

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the Kremlin's grand design



THE SOVIET UNION is expanding its influence and backing it up with military might while going through the motions of making bilateral deals with the United States (such as the nuclear nonproliferation treaty). Quarrels within the Arab world are forcing it into greater dependence on Moscow. Egypt and Syria are ideal air and naval bases for the Soviet Union, bases that will enable it to break out of its previous geographical confinement. In addition, there is the danger that the former French naval base in Algeria, Mers-el-Kebir, may fall into Russian hands. Mers-el-Kebir was a NATO base built with NATO funds.

STAT The Soviet Union is also exerting strong diplomatic pressure on Malta. In its own way it can solve the economic and social crisis that hit the island after the withdrawal of the British fleet. The Red fleet has at least thirty to forty units stationed in the Mediterranean, among them the most advanced missile cruisers of the Kresta-class and submarines. Once it acquires bases in the Mediterranean, the Soviet Union will be in a position to tie up the American Sixth Fleet and threaten NATO's southern flank.

Talks are now in progress, and they should be taken seriously, to turn Aden into a Soviet base. This would mean Soviet control of the Suez Canal route. British sources report that India is negoti-


ating with Moscow on the question of bases in the Indian Ocean. All this is happening almost simultaneously, after years of strenuous Soviet building in two strategic areas: its navy and its missile force. Russia is challenging the strategic advances of the United States' defense perimeter. To do so it is spending roughly 33 billion rubles (37.5 billion dollars) this year, far more than the U.S.S.R. ever allotted to its military budget.

Right after the war the Soviet Union started building its merchant marine. It has grown rapidly. One product of this program has been the creation of a dense network of reconnaissance ships, which have engaged in oceanographic expeditions to study the oceans of the world. Today the Soviet Union has over 100 specialized oceanographic vessels—a number exceeding that of all other countries combined.

The Soviet fishing fleet is the biggest in the world. It has a large contingent of trawlers that carry out electronic intelligence missions similar to that of the American ship, Pueblo, captured by the North Koreans. The rest of the merchant marine fleet has reached a registered gross tonnage of 10 million, which means it has doubled in four years. Expansion plans call for a target of 27 million tons by 1980. If they hit it, the primacy of the American merchant marine will be hard pressed. This development has been no secret to the West, but nobody believed in the possibility of a significant military confrontation outside territorial zones of influence.

Cuba should have put an end to such illusions. However, while the West complacently congratulated itself on its own firmness, the East drew long-term conclusions from the crisis. The Red fleet was systematically developed for long-distance operations. The expansion of the nuclear defense network has been speeded up with the production of defensive anti-ballistic missiles and offensive Fractional Orbit Bombardment Systems (FOBS). Fully armed Soviet missile submarines patrol the Atlantic. The Russians have turned to satellites and large radar ships in order to solve two problems: to improve the operation of their warning, control and missile guidance systems, and to overcome the disadvantages of the physically unfavorable land-locked position which prevented them from establishing control over all routes aimed like arrows at their country.

The Soviet Union took the last step toward becoming a modern sea power when—after long consideration—it decided to build large aircraft carriers. (Khrushchev: "The floating coffins of capitalism.") They are 30,000- to 40,000-ton ships, larger than their American counterparts.



Pierre in AUX ECOUTES, Paris

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An American aircraft carrier, deployed by the United States to give deterrent muscle to its peace guarantees, can be most effectively neutralized by a corresponding Soviet carrier in the same waters. Moreover, in a crisis area, the Soviet Union can counter combat-ready units having landing ships and "leathernecks" with "triphjbian" marines.

Soviet strategy includes the possibility of a big war. The Red navy now possesses a submarine fleet which can bring Europe and the United States under fire with 130 to 200 nuclear war-headed ballistic missiles. An increase in the number of such missiles to 300 by 1972 is planned. They are no less dangerous to the ocean-bordered United States than America's approximately 450

Polaris and Poseidon missiles are to the U.S.S.R.

The number of Soviet missile carriers—from cruisers to torpedo boats—is mounting rapidly. In the Baltic alone, along a so-called coastal front the Soviet Union maintains 140,000 naval personnel aboard about 5 cruisers, 24 destroyers, 20 frigates, 100 submarine chasers, 130 minesweepers, 70 submarines and 180 torpedo boats. Many of these craft belong to missile units. In addition, there is a naval air force with 250 planes and another 1,000 aircraft divided into three air forces stationed near the coast, and 100 amphibious vehicles for a first landing wave and cargo vessel space for a second landing wave of four to five Soviet divisions. This entire force, not including the military potential of the Eastern Bloc satellites, is four times as large as the Danish German defensive potential in the Baltic area. With the construction of aircraft carriers and bases outside Russian territory, the Red fleet will complete the transition from its traditional defensive posture into an instrument of offensive power for a global policy.

Brighter after dark

"During daylight hours few places will have much sunshine."—B.B.C. weather forecast.

Peterborough in THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, London

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STAT The Soviet Union has already dislodged the United States from its absolute hegemony as a world power with its missiles. It is now beginning to close the numerical gap embodied in the current one-to-three ratio and to break the atomic stalemate. Radar and photo-satellite reconnaissance have disclosed that about 200 new launching ramps for intercontinental ballistic missiles are being constructed annually in the Soviet Union. The numerical infrastructure for 1,000 land-based I.C.B.M.'s may be completed by 1970. It should be noted that Soviet I.C.B.M.'s can carry a bigger payload than American missiles. This factor has given the Russians an edge in the current race of both powers to load a rocket with a number of warheads ("space omnibuses") which can zero in on different targets.

STAT The two world powers have also developed a second nuclear monster: an earth-orbiting megaton missile which can be guided from orbit in any desired direction toward a target. This happened, ingeniously enough, within the framework of a treaty forbidding the use of outer space for military purposes. The treaty has not been formally violated, since the missile does not completely circle the earth. . . .

The United States is growing concerned about the ever-increasing ability of the Soviet Union to operate close to American shores with its sea-based missiles. It is far more difficult to intercept and destroy these missiles, due to their shorter flight time and trajectory inside the atmosphere, than intercontinental missiles that fly high above the atmosphere. The Americans have put their hopes in developing short-range weapons with laser rays that can home in much more accurately and quickly on a target. In this competition the Soviet Union enjoys a defensive advantage geographically: the industrial centers of the United States can be reached much more quickly from the open sea than those of the Soviet Union.

Thus, the Russians are improving both components of their nuclear strategy: the drive to the oceans and the attack on American superiority in missiles. Both are capable of neutralizing the United States as the protective and deterrent power of the West, depriving it of credibility, and dethroning it as the world political power.

Free drinks all around

Prominently displayed in a London bar is the message: "In case of nuclear attack, drinks are on the house."

From LINK, New Delhi

Why Europe fears the Russian Navy

Translated from EPOCA, Milan


STAT "The Russians haven't sent their navy into the Mediterranean . . . just to get a suntan." That was the catchy line quoted in London's Fleet Street pubs. Livio Pesce, writing in the popular, independent Milan weekly *Epoca*, somberly agreed. As he sees the Soviet presence . . .

TODAY OUR wartime navy plays a universal role. It is able to fight underwater, above the water, and in the air." This might seem to be a lapidary line spoken by a successor of Nelson, when Great Britain "ruled the seas." Instead, these are words dictated last February 14 to *Pravda* by Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, naval commander and Vice Minister of Defense of the U.S.S.R. . . .

STAT Today the strategic balance of power is shifting to the sea and in favor of the U.S.S.R. Proof of this can be found in the presence, now permanent, of a strong Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean on NATO's southern flank. In January 1967 there were scarcely ten or twelve warships in the ex *Mare Nostrum*. Currently cruising there now are forty-five to fifty-five units. . . .

The Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean are still inferior to the American Sixth Fleet. The Russians can closely pursue the American units from Tangiers to the Bosphorus, upset their maneuvers, intercept their messages and follow naval drills at a distance of 110 yards. But they are not right now in a position to carry on direct battle encounters. Experts assure us that if war broke out tomorrow, the American Sixth Fleet would prevail over the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean. But this certainty, for Italy, is not at all consoling. In the first place, remember, our safety is not in our own hands. Secondly, the Sixth Fleet is not at our disposal. If the United States, whose prevalent interests are in the Pacific, should decide to use its Sixth Fleet in that part of the world or elsewhere, the Soviets would become the masters of the Mediterranean. And apart from that possibility, nothing is stopping the U.S.S.R. from further strengthening her naval forces on a chess board which is of vital importance to us.

Three-quarters of Italy's territory extends into the Mediterranean. Her coasts, including the islands, measure 4,631 miles—that is, four times the land confines. Every year thousands of ships



Flora in DIE ZEIT, Hamburg

enter and depart from Italian ports, loading and unloading about 200 million tons of merchandise. Italy receives about 75 percent of her raw materials and necessary products from the sea. Our merchant marine, made up of 3,979 ships with a gross tonnage of over 6 million, ranks eighth in the world. Freedom of the seas is vital to us. Should it be quashed, we would die of hunger. But even before this catastrophe occurs, Italy must be concerned with the strategic balance of power in the Mediterranean, a condition which determines its future as a free nation.

The Soviet naval presence is presently altering this balance. It may well be that the U.S.S.R. has no aggressive intentions. But her warships "show their flag" in the Mediterranean; they announce and support a politics of power far greater than that which the Mediterranean countries, from the Bosphorus to Gibraltar, can maintain. Of these, Italy, Turkey and Greece form part of NATO. France figures that its nuclear deterrent, represented on the sea by three Polaris-type submarines and by a fourth in dock, enables it to look tranquilly upon the U.S.S.R.'s Mediterranean fleet...

Last October, the brilliant Israeli victory over the Arabs was suddenly darkened by the sinking of the destroyer *Elath*—the work of a surface-to-surface Styx missile shot from a Komar-type Soviet gunboat flying the Egyptian flag. The *Elath* was the first, and up to now has been the only, ship sunk by that deadly weapon, guided to its target by a system of interception-proof infrared rays so rapid that they permit no defense other than preventive attack. The precision of that test of strength, settled in cold blood during a precarious

(continued on page 63)

The Soviets' thrust in Asia—trade

By GENE GREGORY

From FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Hong Kong

"The Russians Are Coming" was the heading in the solidly edited *Far Eastern Economic Review*, the weekly published in Hong Kong and widely circulated in the Orient. But, for now, the Russians were coming to trade and had already scored a notable success in Japan. Gene Gregory reports . . .

HAS THE U.S.S.R.'s position in Asia reached a decisive turning point? Developments in recent months show an upsurge of Russian trade, aid and diplomatic activities in many Asian countries. India, Pakistan, Japan and Iran are among the major Russian "projects," while inroads are being made into several other nations, some of which have, until recently, had nothing but a cold shoulder to offer the Soviet Union.

But if the successes of the present team in the Kremlin can be attributed to a more aggressive and realistic policy in Asia, they are also due to an extraordinary consistency of luck combined with an uncanny ability to profit from the misfortunes and ineptitudes of others: China's excesses at home and its mishandling of foreign policy; the India-Pakistan conflict; the passion-fired bellicosity of the Arabs; escalation of the Vietnam war; Britain's withdrawal from Asia. In the containment of an unpredictable China, Soviet leaders have found a *raison d'être* that will win

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Russia's roving fleet... destiny in the Pacific

The Soviet Navy's maneuvers, conducted sixty-seven times a year, show that it has shifted from the Japan Sea to the Pacific. For several years they have crossed the Korean Strait, and held maneuvers on the sea south of Kyushu or on the Black Current off Ushio Point of the Kii Peninsula.

Furthermore, what we cannot ignore in the Soviet maritime development plan is that the country is giving every possible aid to its allies in the Middle East, Asia and Africa so that they can construct navies big enough to engage in oceanic operations by the side of the Soviet Navy. One such ally is the U.A.R. Another is Indonesia, which is located in the center of Southeast Asian waters. . . .

The quality of the vessels comprising the Soviet Far Eastern Navy is going to be subjected to rapid change, to say nothing of that of the Sixth and Seventh Fleets, which are the main body of the navy. The submarine fleet, which has been assigned to Petropavlovsk on the

Kamchatka Peninsula, is not what it was several years ago. Apart from its six cruisers, some of its sixty-odd destroyers have already been replaced with Kynda-class and Kashin-class vessels. In Far Eastern waters there are already eighteen nuclear submarines. It is important to note that the submarine fleet is largely composed of H-type 3,500-ton submarines and E-type 4,500-ton or 5,600-ton submarines, each one equipped with three Saab missiles and each with a range of 650 miles.

The major operational grounds of the Red navy in the future must be the Indian Ocean and the Pacific—a huge marine space surrounding the Asian mainland and the Archipelago of Japan.

We must expect, therefore, that the present and future moves of the Soviet Navy will seriously affect the destiny of Asia and Japan. In this sense, the U.S.S.R.'s maritime policy poses the greatest problem to us.

support at home and abroad for a stronger Soviet role in Asia.

Now the real success story in Russia's Far Eastern trade is told by Japanese figures. From a meager \$40 million total turnover in 1958, when Soviet postwar trade with Japan finally got underway, exchanges between the two countries rose to about \$450 million last year. The Soviet Union's exports to Japan, which climbed an impressive 30 percent in 1966 and remained at the same high level throughout last year, have consistently exceeded imports since 1964.

How beneficial this has been, in terms of immediate profits, is not at all clear. A look at the steady deterioration in its trade terms, however, suggests that the Soviet Union's trade with Japan has been motivated mainly by longer-term economic and political considerations. While total exports to Japan were virtually skyrocketing in 1966, Soviet deliveries of machinery and equipment were halved. Exports of raw materials went up, but at distinctly unfavorable prices.

Oil, a major Soviet export to Japan, provides an even more interesting insight into Soviet Far Eastern trade policy. The U.S.S.R. sold greatly increased quantities of crude oil to Japan in 1966 at only \$7.80 a ton. At the same time Soviet oil deliveries to recalcitrant Communist states continued to decline. Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung described the drop as the "oil squeeze." And even the privileged protectorate of Mongolia seemed to be given a lower priority than Japan.

Significantly, distinguished Russian visitors have become even more frequent in Tokyo than American warships are in Japanese harbors. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's second visit to

Tokyo late last year was followed in January by the large delegation headed by Mr. Baibakov. And before the month was ended, a high-powered political delegation, led by Politburo member Mikhail Suslov and Party Central Committee Secretary Boris Ponomarev, arrived to normalize relations with Japan's fragmented Communist Party. The delegation managed to reach agreement on "normalizing relations" but did not achieve their other important aim of persuading the J.C.P. to attend the Budapest conference. The sheer weight of these delegations is eloquent testimony to the nature and importance of Japanese relations.

In any effort to checkmate China, Japan is bound to be an important asset. Its size and importance as the world's third largest economic power alone would make Japan an important ally in East Asia. But now with Japan apparently destined to fill, at least in part, the vacuum left by Britain as it withdraws from Southeast Asia, links with Tokyo become even more vital—perhaps as much to avoid head-on clashes with the Japanese in the future as to keep China within its boundaries and possibly eventually to effect a desirable change in the Chinese order of things.

Apart from these considerations, the Soviets are eager to contribute as much as possible to the weakening of links between Japan and the U.S. With Japanese export sales so heavily concentrated in the U.S. market, the Soviets—having little that Japan needs besides low-cost oil and other raw materials—are counting on their proposal for Japanese participation in the development of Siberia to move Tokyo at least a few notches in their direction. And from all indications, they can count on a continuing Japanese

interest in new Siberian development projects.

Chief among these are the exploitation of the Yakutsk oil and natural gas fields and the Tayshet iron and coal deposits. The Russians are seeking a Japanese-built 4,838-mile pipeline from the Yakutsk fields to Nakhodka on the Pacific Coast, to be paid for with the deliveries of 10 billion cubic meters [13.08 billion cubic yards] of natural gas annually—for a period of twenty years. For the development of an iron and steel industry in Tayshet, the Soviets would like to obtain a Japanese steel mill for delivery and construction during the 1971-1975 five-year plan period, Japanese-built iron and coal bulk carriers, and assistance in the construction of expanded port facilities in Mago, Nakhodka, Vanino and Vladivostok. Also included in the five-year agreement are orders for more than ninety Japanese-built ships. To compensate, the Soviet Union would supply Japan with iron ore, coal, nonferrous metals and timber on a fixed schedule of deliveries at predetermined

prices. The Russians are also eager to get further Japanese participation in the exploitation of Northern Sakhalin oilfields.

Until now, however, the generally enthusiastic reception of the Soviet proposals by Japanese businessmen have been dampened by Soviet insistence upon too much credit, over too long a period, and at too-low rates of interest. But Japanese officials have promised to give the Soviet proposals special attention. Japan will be extremely cautious, however, about any arrangements that would enable the Soviets to apply pressure—through control of raw-material supplies—similar to that exerted on Cuba, North Korea and China.

The U.S.S.R. is now close to exerting the kind of influence in the Far East Russia has sought for centuries. But it remains to be seen whether that influence will have the beneficial effects that Bismarck, with all his wisdom, predicted it would have on the Asian scene.

The Turks debate NATO

Get out or get hurt...

The North Atlantic Treaty affords no binding guarantees of military assistance in the event of aggression. Nor is the organization in a position to make the United States intervene militarily to help a member. America is the only nation in NATO with thermonuclear power. It is the mightiest in terms of conventional weapons and the richest in financial resources. If America finds it useful from the standpoint of its own policies and national interest, it may intervene. If not, it will not intervene. No nation has the power to affect its decision. Why, then, did we come to believe that NATO—or, in reality, the United States—would safeguard and defend us? We just took America's word for it...

NATO offers Turkey no safeguards. Its strategy and military organization are contrary to our national defense requirements. Because of NATO and U.S. military bases, Turkey could any time be thrust into a nuclear holocaust against its will. If a Soviet-U.S. conflict anywhere in the world leads to armed confrontation, the Soviet Union will surely seek to destroy American military bases and facilities in Turkey in order to protect itself.

We must dissociate ourselves from NATO right now while the climate of opinion throughout the world is quite favorable for such action. For the defense of our nation, we must formulate a more suitable strategy and military organization. The caveat, "Without NATO and America we shall fall into Russia's lap," smacks of dishonor and decreased national independence and dignity.

Behice Boran, member of the left-wing Turkish Labor Party, in MILLIYET, Istanbul.

... Stay in: if the U.S. is wiped out, that's it

The propaganda campaign now being waged against NATO in some Communist circles is baseless and detrimental to Turkey. First of all, the argument which holds that the Turkish Army is no longer a "national" or "sovereign" force and that it cannot be mobilized without the approval of NATO's commanders is nothing but idle talk. We can withdraw some or all of our military forces from NATO whenever we think it necessary. Secondly, an assessment of our NATO affiliations should be based on geopolitical and strategic considerations. In a third world war, the primary targets will be the enemy's nuclear manufacture and launching sites as well as its other war industries. The Soviet Union is bound to concentrate its initial offensive on such targets in the United States. Western Europe will become a target only in the second phase. Long-range missiles have obviated the need for short-range bases. It is incompatible with the realities of modern strategy to suppose that Turkey would be the first target for a Soviet offensive in the event of a third world war just because it is a NATO member. The essential objective of the Soviet strategy will be the crippling of the United States with a massive attack on the American mainland. If America is eliminated from the war as a result of an offensive which utilizes all of the resources at the Soviet Union's disposal, how could Turkey or any other nation possibly withstand the Russian onslaught?

NATO has served Turkey well. Had our own statesmen been more cautious and conscientious, those aspects of our NATO affiliation which we now find objectionable would never have reared their heads. NATO should now be reorganized in accordance with prevailing conditions. NATO should continue and Turkey should remain a member, provided that we secure equal rights and stronger guarantees.

Colonel Alpaslan Türkeş, chairman of the right-wing Republican Peasants' National Party, in MILLIYET, Istanbul.